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We distinguish two components of self-confidence in a financial market: private 
confidence measures the self-confidence level of speculators, while public confidence 
measures the confidence level they attribute to their competitors. We then study how 
independent changes in these components affect the equilibrium trading strategies. We 
conduct the analysis in a financial market with imperfect competition where investors 
submit limit orders. We calculate the unique linear symmetric equilibrium as well as the 
major indicators of the market. In addition to providing a partial explanation for the 
excess volatility of asset prices as well as for trading volume unexplained by the arrival 
of new information, our model highlights the differences between the effects of public 
versus private confidence.  
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1. Introduction 
Investor sentiment, that is, changes in trading strategies not fully based on the arrival of 
hard information about the fundamentals, is known to affect the performance of 
financial markets (see, for example, Black, 1986). An important class of such not fully 
rational behavior is that of overconfident traders. This paper provides a formal analysis 
of a financial market with such speculators. Our main contribution to the literature is 
that we are able to separate the effects of “private overconfidence” -traders being 
overconfident-, from those of “public overconfidence” -the traders believing that the 
market (that is, the rest of the traders) is overconfident. This distinction is relevant since 
these two indicators -while positively correlated- need not vary together: just because 
there is the perception of a “bull” market, a given trader need not become more 
confident. 
We have ample experimental and empirical evidence documenting that 
overconfidence pervades everyday life, and therefore its analysis is pertinent. For 
instance, Svenson (1981) considers overconfidence concerning the ability to drive a car 
and he estimates that over 80% believe they rank among the best 30%.  Focusing on 
pre-arbitration negotiation, Neale and Bazerman (1983) find that 68% of negotiators 
believe the arbitrator will favor their offer. Another typical setting refers to the 
entrepreneurs’ decision about entering into a market. Here, Camerer and Lovallo (1999) 
find that excess entry leads to negative industry profits in more than 70% of the 
experiments they perform, while Dunne et al. (1988) estimate that 60% of real 
businesses fail in the first five years.1   
Most of the evidence in a competitive setting is consistent with a hypothesis 
slightly different from the presence of overconfident traders. For example, the 
entrepreneurs’ decision to enter a market in the presence of excess entry may be rational 
even if they have the right amount of self-confidence, if they believe (in this case, 
mistakenly) that their competitors are overconfident. Note that the very evidence that 
there are many overconfident people substantiates a generalized belief that on average 
the market participants are overconfident. This belief needs not vary together with the 
actual realizations of the agents’ self-confidence.  
                                                 
1 For further evidence, see also Alpert and Raiffa (1982), Griffin and Tversky (1992), Heath and Tversky 
(1991), Lichtenstein et al. (1982), Oskamp (1965), and Wagenaar and Keren (1986). 2 
Recently, there has been a boom of papers that study the effects of 
overconfidence in a financial market. Most of these address the issue using as a 
benchmark the model of Kyle (1985) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) with informed 
traders and noise traders submitting market orders to a fair-pricing market maker. Benos 
(1998) assumes an extreme form of overconfidence, where traders believe that their 
signal is void of noise. He also shows that overconfident traders can survive in an 
evolutionary model.2  Kyle and Wang (1997) do parametrize the level of 
overconfidence at the cost of considering two traders only. Odean (1998) assumes a 
single insider who is overconfident. He also analyzes the effects of overconfidence in 
competitive markets. All these authors obtain that trading volume, price volatility and 
price informativeness increase with overconfidence. Daniel et al. (1998) and Gervais 
and Odean (1997) present dynamic models with an endogenous level of trader self-
confidence. They assume that the updating process of these beliefs is asymmetric: 
traders attribute good results to their own ability and their self-confidence rises, while 
they blame bad results on external factors and barely correct their self-confidence. 
Our analysis differs from the previous ones in two main respects. First, we do 
not impose common knowledge of the investors’ level of self-confidence and this 
allows us to differentiate between the effects of changes in the traders’ beliefs about the 
level of self-confidence of the others and the effects of changes in the level of their own 
self-confidence. Therefore, our analysis can show how the perception about the self-
confidence of the others affects both the behavior of investors and the corresponding 
equilibrium.3 
Second, our analysis considers a richer space of strategies, since we allow price 
dependent demands. This modeling choice also simplifies the belief structure, since we 
need not be concerned about the market maker’s beliefs, which are crucial in the market 
order setting. We thus study overconfidence in the framework of Kyle's (1989) model of 
an imperfectly competitive financial market with informed speculators submitting limit 
orders and noise traders. The non-competitiveness of the market has a special 
                                                 
2 Wang (1997) finds similar results in the context of overconfident fund managers. 
3 Note that Kyle and Wang (1997) also model a version of public and private confidence. Since, in their 
model the first order beliefs are common knowledge, they do this by varying the traders’ beliefs about the 
precision of the other’s signal. However, in the market order setting they use, this parameter does not 
affect the equilibrium strategies, since the traders cannot condition on the price. But this is the only 
avenue through which those beliefs could matter. 3 
importance in our case, since one of the main concerns of a speculator that is affected 
by her overconfidence is how to conceal her information from her competitors. To 
obtain explicit solutions for the equilibrium strategies, we assume that traders are risk 
neutral, just as in Caballé (1992). In the absence of risk aversion the calculations 
become tractable and with imperfect competition we still have existence of equilibrium. 
A standard consequence of overconfidence is that traders bear more risk than they 
would if they were not overconfident (see Odean, 1998). Thus, in our analysis we 
assume away this effect and concentrate on additional patterns of the resulting behavior 
instead.
 
A straightforward way to model overconfidence could be to hypothesize biased 
prior beliefs.4  However, in the case of informed speculation, there is a more innocuous 
assumption. Since investors receive private information before they act, overconfidence 
can be a result of overvaluing this information or the ability in interpreting it and, 
hence, there is no need to assume any biased predictor. This way, the bias appears 
endogenously in the posteriors. We thus model overconfidence via erroneous, 
optimistic beliefs about the precision of the private signal received. An overconfident 
trader receives an independent draw from the underlying distribution, just as a “normal” 
speculator would. However, he mistakenly thinks that the draw comes from a 
distribution with the same mean but with lower variance than the true distribution.  
Now, the others do not necessarily know an individual’s degree of self-
confidence, that is, his belief about the precision of his signal. This leads us to build a 
model where the individual confidence levels are private information and traders have 
subjective beliefs about each other’s level of self-confidence. We do not impose any 
correlation between a trader’s confidence and the beliefs he entertains about the others’. 
In fact, we consider that one of the most important characteristics of an overconfident 
trader is that he thinks that he is not overconfident even when he believes that 
everybody else is. Of course, the belief hierarchies do not stop at this level. The traders 
also form beliefs about what the others think they think about the others’ level of self-
confidence, and so on. In order to maintain tractability, we cut short the description of 
this hierarchy by assuming that the second order beliefs (formed about the self-
confidence level of the other traders) are common knowledge. The strategies used by 
                                                 
4 This is the approach taken, for example, by De Long et al. (1990) and Palomino (1996). 4 
the agents will thus depend on their own self-confidence and on their beliefs about the 
self-confidence of the others.  
We compute the equilibrium in two steps. First we derive the hypothetical 
equilibrium that would result if the traders’ beliefs about public confidence were 
correct. This would be the final result, if we followed the standard literature. Instead, 
we assume that each trader uses this equilibrium only to anticipate the strategies of the 
competitors he thinks that he is facing, and he plays the best response (based on his true 
beliefs) to these. For reasons of tractability, we assume that traders entertain degenerate 
beliefs, that is, they will assign probability one to a single type (which, in fact, may be 
non-existent). Moreover, in order to obtain closed form analytical solutions, we assume 
that the beliefs are symmetric across individuals. 
After finding the equilibrium strategies of the model, we calculate several 
market indicators. We consider our results on price volatility and trading volume the 
most empirically relevant. Based on an empirical study of the orange juice futures 
market, Roll (1984) was the first to point out one of the most puzzling characteristics of 
financial markets: they exhibit patterns of trading volumes and price volatilities that 
cannot be fully explained by the information flow about the fundamental values of the 
assets. As expected, through higher sensitivity to private information and greater 
disparity of posterior beliefs, overconfidence does partially justify these phenomena. 
However, we show that price volatility may be decreasing in the level of self-
confidence when traders are not very self-confident. On the other hand, the relationship 
between price volatility and public confidence is also non-monotonic. However, price 
volatility is decreasing in public confidence when traders believe that the market is very 
self-confident. 
In principle, one could think that both private and public confidence have 
qualitatively the same effect on individual trading behavior. After all, the best response 
to aggressive trading is aggressive trading. We show, however, that the similarity is far 
from total. In fact, the speculators’ trading intensity as a function of public confidence 
changes in a non-monotonic way: for low values of public confidence level, trading 
intensity decreases with public confidence. As a consequence, the weight of the two 
types of biased beliefs in the aggregate effect of overconfidence is not constant. Public 
confidence dominates at its extreme values, while private confidence is more relevant at 
intermediate values to explain the trading volume. 5 
A further consequence of the distinct effects of private and public confidence is 
that they also differ from those of the standard treatment, where public and private 
confidence is assumed to coincide (since private confidence is assumed to be common 
knowledge). As a result, we identify three different definitions of self-confidence in a 
market, each of which leads to somewhat different comparative statics. 
The rest of the paper continues as follows: We give a detailed description of our 
model in Section 2. In Section 3 we find the equilibrium. In Section 4 we discuss some 
properties of the market equilibrium. Finally, Section 5 concludes. The proofs of our 
results are presented in the Appendix. 
 
2. The Model 
As mentioned above, we use Kyle's (1989) model as our basic framework. However, for 
the sake of tractability we make the simplifying assumptions that: (i) there are no 
uninformed speculators, and (ii) traders are risk neutral. That is, we consider a market 
where a single risky asset is traded between two types of investors: liquidity (or noise) 
traders and informed speculators who submit limit orders (or demand schedules). The 
random payoff of the asset is denoted by ~ v . The aggregate trading quantity of liquidity 
traders is described by the exogenous random variable ~ z . There are N speculators, each 
of whom is in the possession of a private signal, in for speculator n, which is the 
realization of the random variable  n i ~ .5  We make the following standard assumption 
about the true distributions of the exogenous random variables of the model: 
Assumption DA The aggregate demand of noise traders is normally 
distributed with mean zero and variance 
2
z s , that is, ~ z ~ ( )
2 , 0 z N s . Similarly, 
~ v ~ ( ) v , N t / 1 0 , so that  v t  is the precision of ~ v . The signal that speculators 
receive can be written as the sum of the random payoff and some noise: 
~ ~ ~ i v e n n = + , where ~ en ~ ( ) e , N t / 1 0 , n N =1,..., . That is, all the speculators 
receive information of the same quality. Finally, ~ v , ~ z  and the ~ en, n N =1,..., , 
are distributed independently.  
                                                 
5 Throughout this paper, we will omit the tilde when we refer to the realization of a random variable. 6 
Except for the precision of ~ en, n N =1,..., , all the above distributional 
characteristics are common knowledge. The vector of private precisions, on the other 
hand, is not only not common knowledge but it is not even known to any of the traders. 
Consequently, the beliefs of the agents about the reliability of their own and of each 
other’s information are crucial in determining their behavior. First of all, agents 
entertain first-order beliefs, that is, beliefs about the precisions of the private signals in 
the economy. We do not impose common knowledge of all these first order beliefs. 
This leads us to the explicit consideration of the second-order beliefs: the beliefs the 
players hold about the others’ first-order beliefs.6 To keep the analysis tractable, we 
assume symmetry and that the second-order beliefs (and therefore all the remaining 
levels of the belief hierarchies) are common knowledge among the speculators. Given 
symmetry, the latter assumption simply amounts to saying that the general opinion 
about investor confidence in the market is common knowledge. We next describe our 
specific assumptions on the actual beliefs held by the players: 
(i) The first order beliefs of the investors about the precision of the random 
vector of signal noises { } ~
,..., en n N =1  are described as follows: it is common 
knowledge that each trader believes that the precision of each of his competitors' 
noise is  e t . Moreover, each trader puts probability one on his own precision 
being  e qt  (instead of the true precision  e t ), where q , the coefficient multiplying 
the true precision  e t , is the private confidence level of the traders. A speculator is 
then said to be overconfident if and only if  1 > q . Recall that q  is not common 
knowledge.  
(ii) The second order beliefs are the beliefs of each investor about the first 
order beliefs of the others. Each trader believes almost surely that the public 
confidence level is s, that is, she believes that her opponents think that the 
precision of the noise of their own signals is  e st . Moreover, as a consequence of 
the assumed first order beliefs, each trader puts probability one on all the other 
                                                 
6 Note that the second order beliefs should be defined in general as a joint distribution over the vector of 
precisions and the first order beliefs. However, we assume that the vector of precisions and the first order 
beliefs are statistically independent, and so second order beliefs are fully described by the corresponding 
marginal distributions. 7 
traders believing that the precision of her noise term is  e t . These second order 
beliefs are common knowledge. Note that a trader thinks that the rest are 
overconfident if and only if  1 > s .  
Since second order beliefs are common knowledge, the types of investors are 
composed of the signals and the first and second order beliefs about the coefficient of 
the signal precision. Given the above assumptions, the profile of relevant investor types 
is  ( ) { } N n n c c i ,..., 1
2 1, , = { } { } ( )
N s s q ´ ´ Â Î , . The following table summarizes the 
corresponding hierarchy of beliefs:  
(INSERT TABLE 1) 
 Each investor n submits a demand schedule (or generalized limit order)  Xn, 
which is a mapping from the asset price p into the number xn of shares he desires to 
trade at this price. Let the set of such mappings be À. The strategy of each trader n,  n j , 
is a mapping from the three-dimensional space of types into demand schedules, 
{ } { } À ® ´ ´ Â s s q n ,    : j . For simplicity, we assume that all traders use the same 
strategy, so we can drop the sub-index of j . 






n z p X
1
  0 ) ( .        (1) 
Note that equation (1) implicitly defines the equilibrium price p as a function of the 
profile of the speculators’ strategies and noise trading. Thus, we can write 
( ) ( ) ( ) z c c i c c i p p N , , , ,..., , ,
2 1 2 1
1 j j = . Obviously, the quantity xn of asset traded by 
speculator n is also a function of the speculators’ strategies and noise trading, and so we 
write  ( ) ( ) ( ) z c c i c c i x x N n n , , , ,..., , ,
2 1 2 1
1 j j = .  
The speculators are assumed to be risk neutral and to maximize expected profits. 
The random profits of speculator n for a given vector of private and public confidence 
are thus given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) z c c i c c i x z c c i c c i p v N n N n
~ , , , ~ ,..., , , ~ ~ , , , ~ ,..., , , ~ ~ ~ 2 1 2 1
1
2 1 2 1
1 j j j j p × - =  . 
We look for a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. As in Kyle (1989), for 
reasons of tractability we restrict attention to strategies that are linear in the signal, and 8 
to demand schedules that are linear in the price.7  Then strategies take the following 
functional form: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )   . , , , , , 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 p c c i c c c c c c i n n g b a j - + º     (2) 
Given our assumption that beliefs are point beliefs, the equilibrium has an 
unusual feature, which allows us to obtain the explicit solution, but nevertheless is 
perfectly compatible with Harsányi’s original definition. Note that, by assumption, c
1 º 
q and thus there exists no type with c
1 = s. However, just as in the case of non-
degenerate beliefs, we need to model the behavior of each type, which is attached 
positive probability in the beliefs of someone. The difference is that in our model, some 
types only exist in the beliefs of others. The operational advantage of our approach 
comes from the fact that we can easily separate the calculation of equilibrium strategies 
into two steps. In the first step, we calculate the equilibrium strategies of the imaginary 
types. A profile of these strategies could be interpreted as an equilibrium of the market 
that traders believe the rest of the traders believe to trade in. This equilibrium would 
also be the one obtained in our model under the standard assumption that the first order 
beliefs are common knowledge and equal to s. Therefore, the profile of 
strategies{ } N n n ,..., 1 = j  satisfies 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]³ × - z s s i s s i s s i x z s s i s s i s s i p v E N n n N n
s
n
~ , , , ~ ,..., , , ~ ,..., , , ~ ~ , , , ~ ,..., , , ~ ,..., , , ~ ~
1 1 j j j j j j  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ], ~ , , , ~ ,..., , , ~ ˆ ,..., , , ~ ~ , , , ~ ,..., , , ~ ˆ ,..., , , ~ ~     1 1 z s s i s s i s s i x z s s i s s i s s i p v E N n n N n
s
n j j j j j j × -
 
for all n = 1,...,N and for every alternative strategy j ˆ , where the operator En
s ( ) ×  is the 
expectation computed using the distributional assumption DA, except that the precision 
of the noise  n e ~  is  e st , whereas the precision of ~ ej (for all  j n ¹ ) is  e t .
8 
  In our case, just as in the usual Bayesian equilibrium, players must play a best 
response to the strategies they attribute to their competitors, weighted by their beliefs. 
Since in our model these beliefs are concentrated, a speculator simply plays a best 
response against a market where the rest of the players play according to the strategies 
of the imaginary market. Therefore, the profile of strategies { } N n n ,..., 1 = j  must also satisfy 
                                                 
7  Rochet and Vila (1994) analyze the existence of non-linear equilibria in the context of Kyle games. 










×  will be computed 9 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]³ × - z s s i s q i s s i x z s s i s q i s s i p v E N n n N n
q
n
~ , , , ~ ,..., , , ~ ,..., , , ~ ~ , , , ~ ,..., , , ~ ,..., , , , ~ ~
1 1 j j j j j j  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ,   ~ , , , ~ ,..., , , ~ ˆ ,..., , , ~ ~ , , , ~ ,..., , , ~ ˆ ,..., , , , ~ ~     1 1 z s s i s q i s s i x z s s i s q i s s i p v E N n n N n
q
n j j j j j j × -
     
for all n = 1,...,N and for every alternative strategy j ˆ , where the operator  En
q ( ) ×  is the 
expectation computed using the distributional assumption DA, except that the precision 
of the noise ~ en  is  e qt , whereas the precision of ~ ej  (for all  j n ¹ ) is  e t . 
Finally, note that if q º  s ¹  1 we recover the equilibrium concept discussed in 
other papers on overconfidence, which assumed common knowledge of the private self-
confidence levels. On the other hand, if  q º  s º  1 we recover the standard concept of 
noisy rational expectations equilibrium with imperfect competition introduced in Kyle 
(1989). 
 
3. The Equilibrium 
The following proposition provides the explicit equations describing the equilibrium 
defined in the previous section: 
 









. Then the following is the unique 
symmetric linear equilibrium strategy: 
( ) ( ) ( ) p s q i s q s q i n n , , , , g b j - = , 
where 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )s s N N
N N
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Note that the equilibrium strategy can be rewritten as  
                                                                                                                                               
using the true distributions given in assumption DA. 10 
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That is, the traders’ strategy can be described by the parameter of trading intensity, 












) ( . The first 
thing to note is that the relative weight a trader attaches to the information revealed 
through price as compared to weight he attaches to her private signal,  ) (q d , is 
independent of the level of public confidence. This is not surprising. Recall that each 
trader believes that she knows the self-confidence level of the other traders and 
therefore, in equilibrium, she knows their strategies. Consequently, independently of 
their level of public confidence, she can invert these to infer their information, the 
quality of which is common knowledge. 
Let us now investigate how do the equilibrium coefficients change as a function of the 
different confidence levels. There are three relevant cases to study: a common change in 
both the public and the private confidence (corresponding to the standard models on 
overconfidence), or a variation in either one of these, holding the other constant.  
 
Proposition 3.2  
(i)  ( ) ( )
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Figures 1 and 2 give an exhaustive qualitative picture of these comparative 
statics exercises for the functions  ) 1 , (x b ,  ) , 1 ( x b  and  ) ( ˆ x b , and  ) 1 , (x g ,  ) , 1 ( x g  and 
) ( ˆ x g , respectively. 
(INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2) 
Part (i) of the previous proposition tells us that, as the level of private confidence 
increases, the sensitivity of trades both to information and to price increases, while the 
relative sensitivity to price decreases. The fact that, as q increases, speculators put more 
weight (both in absolute and in relative terms) on their information is an obvious 
manifestation of their increased confidence. Note however, that the trading intensity 
does not increase without bound: even if a trader believes that she knows the value of 
the asset, she cuts back on her order in order not to make the price move too much 
against her. This is a standard consequence of the market power associated with 
imperfect competition. Finally, the higher absolute sensitivity to price is due to the fact 
that they want to increase market depth (which is proportional to g ) so as to reduce the 
amount of their information revealed through the price. Note that as q changes, our 
trader thinks that the strategies of the rest of the traders stay constant, since she believes 
that they depend on s, not on q.  Therefore, since each speculator can influence the 
quality of the price as a signal of his private information, an investor who thinks that he 
owns better information increases his coefficient g  so as to reduce the informativeness 
of the price by making it less sensitive to private information. The limiting values of g 
are finite at both extreme values of private confidence. As q increases without bound, 12 
the relative sensitivity to price, d, decreases to one9 and thus g converges to the same 
value as b. On the other hand, as the level of private confidence vanishes, g still remains 
positive. This means that the possession of the public signal makes it possible that the 
gains from trading against the noise traders compensate the losses from trading against 
the informed traders. 
Turning to the level of public confidence considered in part (ii) of the previous 
proposition, observe that the trading intensity b  is a U-shaped function of s. First, let 
us look at what happens when s is small. In this case, each trader thinks that the market 
is under-confident and, as we have seen above, this results in a high g, making the 
market very deep.  In this scenario our trader thinks that the information leakage 
through prices is very weak, so he will behave almost competitively, that is, choosing a 
high b. As we have seen before, this automatically implies that g will be high also, since 
he will want to provide more depth to hide his trade.  If s is large, our trader thinks that 
the market is behaving in an overconfident way, revealing a lot of information through 
the price. Consequently he believes that the price is very informative and, therefore, he 
will choose a high g so as to capture the information embodied in the price. Again, since 
he believes the market to be deep, this leads to a high b as well.10  Note also that an 
unbounded limit is reached for a finite level of public overconfidence. If it is common 

















s . In the interim region he believes the market to be thin, so he 
restricts his sensitivity to information leading to lower values of both b and g. 
Finally, let us see how does the equilibrium strategy vary as we change public 
and private confidence at the same time (part (iii) of Proposition 3.2). This is the type of 
comparative statics that has been done in the literature. The behavior of  ( ) x b ˆ  is 
                                                 
9 Note that the relative price sensitivity is bounded from below by one, since in the limiting case of 
perfect information it is equal to one. 
10 Recall that d is independent of s. 
11 Note that, substituting s in the formula for tn  (see Corollary 4.7) by its upper bound, we obtain that 
the information revealed by prices is the total precision of private information as perceived by each 
speculator, q N e e t t + - ( ) 1 . 13 
straightforward: the better information traders believe that they have at their disposal, 
the more they use it. In this case, however, the trading intensity is not bounded: since all 
traders trade more and more they need not worry as much about hiding their 
information. On the other hand, even if a trader believes that the market has as bad 
information as he does, as the precision of information vanishes, he still prefers not to 
trade.  
The behavior of absolute price sensitivity  ) ( ˆ x g  is similar for high values of 
confidence: it is monotonically increasing, without bound. However, unlike in the case 
where we only moved the private confidence level, for low values of confidence the 
investors increase their  ) ( ˆ x g  as well. This has a straightforward explanation. As x 
decreases, the weight they put on their private information decreases to zero, while even 
with uninformative prices they want to sell when the price is positive and buy when the 
price is negative, and this leads to extreme price sensitivity. 
 
4. Properties of the Equilibrium 
Next, we calculate the major indicators of our market and pay special attention to price 
volatility and expected volume of trade. We start by computing  price volatility: 
 
Corollary 4.1   
( ) [ ]
2 2
2
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The first term describes the amount of variance of the public and private signals 
that is transmitted to the price through the speculators’ trading. It is increasing in q, 
since speculators put higher weight on their information as their confidence increases. 
At the same time it is independent of the level of public confidence, since that only 
affects the trading intensity, but not the relative weights on price and information. The 
second term describes the effect of noise trade. It is decreasing in q, since as the 
speculators’ confidence increases, market depth also increases, making noise trade less 
influential in the determination of the market price. Thus, there is a trade-off, depending 
on the parameters. Price volatility may either increase or decrease with the speculators’ 
level of private confidence. When the level of private confidence is initially very low, 14 
and thus the market is very thin, an increase in q is not translated into a much more 
aggressive trading by the informed speculators, since the price is going to reveal much 
of the perceived improvement in private precision. Therefore, in such a circumstance, 
the negative effect on volatility due to the increase in the depth will outweigh the 
positive effect due to the increase in the size of informed trading. However, when q, and 
therefore the depth of the market, is high, the converse argument applies and we obtain 
higher volatility as the level of private confidence increases. In fact, the following can 
be shown: 
 
Corollary 4.2   
(i) There exists a threshold level of private confidence 
* q  such that 
0 ) (
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* ) ( q q < > . 
(ii) In the limit, as N tends to infinity, 
* q  converges to 
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£  for all s > 0, an implication of part (ii) of the previous 
corollary is that the volatility of prices is increasing in q in a large market whenever the 
speculators do not undervalue their information by more than a factor of 2.  In fact, even 
if the previous explicit result is found only for large markets, we have not been able to 
find any example for which volatility drops as already overconfident speculators (that 
is, speculators having q  > 1) become more overconfident.12 As we have seen, public 
confidence only affects the behavior of volatility through the absolute price sensitivity 
                                                 
12 We have simulated the threshold level 
* q  using an exhaustive grid for the values of the parameters 
appearing in the model. In particular, for the number of investors we have considered all the integer 15 
and, thus, it is inversely U-shaped. As a consequence, the effects of public and private 
confidence on volatility appear as opposed. 
The combined effect of moving the public and private confidence level together 
is markedly different. As shown in part (iv) of the previous proposition, volatility is 
strictly increasing in the level of confidence, just as it is predicted by the literature. 
Figure 3 depicts the three aforementioned volatility curves. 
(INSERT FIGURE 3) 
We can also evaluate the quantitative contribution of the different types of 
overconfidence on price volatility. To this end we consider three cases: (i) when  1 = s  
and q varies, (ii) when  1 = q  and s varies, and (iii) when  s q º . The first case 
corresponds to a situation in which the investors believe that their competitors are 
rational, while each investor is possibly wrong about his own precision. The second 
case corresponds to a situation where every investor has correct beliefs about the 
precision of his own signal, whereas the perceived degree of confidence of the their 
competitors differs from the true one. Finally, the third case is homomorphic to a case 
where the levels of self-confidence are common knowledge. The following corollary 
provides the exact comparison: 
 
Corollary 4.3  
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x  such that  
) ( ˆ ) , 1 ( ) 1 , ( x V x V x V > >  for all  ( )
* * , 0 x xÎ . 
(iii) There exists an open interval  ( ) 2 1,x x  with 
*
1 x x >  and 
* *
2 x x <  such that  
) 1 , ( ) , 1 ( x V x V >  for all  ( ) 2 1,x x xÎ . 
                                                                                                                                               
numbers from 3 to 100.  16 
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Note that parts (i), (ii) and (iii) of the previous corollary imply that private 
confidence contributes more to total price volatility for extreme values of x, whereas the 
contribution of public confidence is more relevant for intermediate values. Note also 
that part (v) implies that price volatility is always bounded. 
Finally, we can calculate the expected trading volume of a speculator, which is 
defined as the mathematical expectation of the absolute value of his demand  ( ) n x E ~ : 
 
Corollary 4.4  The expected volume traded by a speculator is 
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In the expression for trading volume we can see how the volume is divided into 
transactions among speculators and transactions of speculators with noise traders. Since 
the expected trading volume is monotonically increasing in  ) , ( s q b , the behavior of the 
expected volume as a function of both private and public confidence mimic the one of 
the function b . Therefore, we get the following corollary: 
 
Corollary 4.5  
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Not surprisingly, since the volume of liquidity trading is exogenously given, all 
the increase in volume as private overconfidence increases, comes from transactions 
among the speculators, and it is explained by the greater dispersion in their posterior 
beliefs. Note however that private overconfidence can increase only up to a finite limit 
the expected trading volume.  
The equilibrium volume’s dependence on public confidence is characterized by 
the fact that, when speculators think that the rest are mistaken (s is far from one), they 
try to exploit this fact by trading harder. In this case, the expected trading volume can 
become arbitrarily large. As a result, high volumes cannot be explained exclusively by 
the presence of overconfident traders. It is also necessary that they believe that the 
public confidence is either very high or very low. 
It is also worth noting, that, when second-order beliefs are correct ( q s º ), the 
expected volume traded is independent of the qualities of public and private 
information (see part (iii)). This means, for example, that if the precision of public 
information  v t  is increased, the equilibrium price distribution will adjust in such a way 18 
that the amount of trading does not change. Finally, we can perform an exercise similar 
to the one contained in Corollary 4.3 to evaluate the contribution of the different types 
of self-confidence on the expected volume of trade. 
 
Corollary 4.6  
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x  such that  
) 1 , ( ) ( ˆ ) , 1 ( x Q x Q x Q > >  for all  ( ) ' ' , 0 x xÎ . 
(iii) There exists an open interval ( ) 4 3,x x  with  ' 3 x x >  and  ' ' 4 x x <  such that  
) , 1 ( ) 1 , ( x Q x Q >  for all  ( ) 4 3,x x xÎ . 
 
The previous corollary reinforces our previous argument. We see that for 
extreme values of x, public confidence is more relevant to explain a high volume of 
trading since traders believe that their competitors have very erroneous beliefs, and they 
react to this by trading very intensively so as to exploit the others’ misperception. 
However, for intermediate values of x, the contribution of private confidence to trading 
volume becomes more important. 
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of two additional market 
indicators: price informativeness and expected profits of speculators. In order to check 
the informational efficiency of this market, let us define the information content of 
prices as  [ ] [ ]
1 1
) ~ ( ) ~ ~ ( ) , (
- -
- = v Var p v Var s q u t , that is, the increase in precision of the 
beliefs of an outside observer (who knows both the true precision of private signals and 
the equilibrium strategies) about the realization of the random return, due to the 
observation of the equilibrium price.  Similarly,  [ ] [ ]
1 1
) ~ ( ) ~ , ~ ~ ( ) , (
- -
- = v Var i p v Var s q n
q
n n t  
is the increase in precision of the beliefs about the realization of the random return that 
a speculator expects (wrongly, unless q s = =1) from the observation of the equilibrium 19 
price and his private signal.13 
 
Corollary 4.7  
(i) The information content of prices for an observer who knows both the true 
precision of the private signals and the beliefs of the players is  
( ) [ ]















=  ,  
which is increasing in the level of private confidence and it is non-monotone (U-
shaped) in the level of public confidence. 
 (ii) Let  ) , ( ) ( ˆ x x x u u t t º , then  ) ( ˆ x u t  is strictly increasing. 
(iii) The increase in the precision of his estimate of the random return perceived 
by a speculator upon observing the price and his private signal is  
e n
s N









) , (  ,  
which is increasing in both parameters. 
 (iv) Let  ) , ( ) ( ˆ x x x n n t t º , then  ) ( ˆ x n t  is strictly increasing. 
 
As the level of private confidence increases, speculators will overreact to their 
information. As a consequence, overconfident speculators actually reveal more of their 
private information than it would be optimal for them and thus make prices more 
informative. As we have seen before, when the level of public confidence is either low 
or high, speculators expect a deep market and therefore they react strongly to their 
private information. Of course, the speculators perceive it differently, since when s is 
low, they expect the rest to put small weight on their information, making prices little 
revealing. 
Turning to profits, note first that in the current scenario there are two kinds to 
consider: the profits expected by an overconfident - and therefore mistaken - 
                                                 
13 Obviously, the variance operator Varn
q ( ) ×  is defined as  ( ) ( )






n - = . Note also that 
Var v Var v n
q(~) (~) º . 20 
speculator, and the average profits such a speculator actually makes in this market. The 
first quantity, despite the complexity of its calculation, does not provide any additional 
insight so we restrict our attention to the second one. 
 
Corollary 4.8   
(i) The average profit of speculators is  
) , (








p = = P , which is 
decreasing in the level of private confidence and it is non-monotone (inverted U-
shaped) in the level of public confidence. 
(ii) Let  ) , ( ) ( ˆ x x x P º P , then  ) ( ˆ x P  is inverted U-shaped. 
 
Since in a model such as ours, the profits of informed speculators are financed 
by the losses of noise traders, speculators’ profits are increasing in the amount 
(variance) of liquidity trading and decreasing in the number of speculators. Note that the 
coefficient g is proportional to the depth of the market, and liquidity traders are better 
off trading in deep markets. Therefore, as it is easily seen through g, private under-
confidence in the market increases, while private overconfidence decreases, average 
profits of speculators. The first of these results is at first blush surprising.  How can sub-
optimal behavior increase expected profits? Does this mean that in a standard context, 
speculators could gain by under-reacting to their information?  The answer is, 
obviously, not.  What happens in our model is that, when speculators are under-
confident, noise traders are exploited more and this surplus is distributed evenly among 
speculators.  However, in the standard case with common knowledge of the first order 
beliefs, this would not be an equilibrium, since by reacting more to his information, a 
speculator would decrease the surplus only by a little, while he could change its 
distribution in his favor.  In our case, if we had only one overconfident trader, by the 
same argument, he would lose on the modified sharing of the surplus more than he 
would gain by increasing the losses of liquidity traders. Finally, observe that, agreeing 
with intuition, average profits plunge when the level of public confidence takes extreme 




In this paper we have presented a model of trading where the underlying beliefs are not 
only different but also not common knowledge. This environment seems to be most 
adequate to analyze the consequences of speculator overconfidence. We believe that in 
addition to its intrinsic theoretical interest, it should be considered as another step 
towards a better description and understanding of human behavior in the economic 
sphere.  
Our benchmark results generalize to the context of limit-order markets the 
consensus of the literature: when over/under confidence is common knowledge, it 
increases/decreases both price volatility and trading volume. At the same time, we show 
that if the traders’ perception of the level of confidence in the market and their own 
level of confidence may vary independently, these results become significantly 
different. 
The first interesting conclusion we can draw is that generalized private 
overconfidence of the speculators can increase only up to a finite limit both trading 
volume and the depth of the market. That is, to explain very high volume or liquidity 
with overconfidence it is necessary that public overconfidence be high. In addition, 
public under-confidence also leads to high volume. Thus, to explain very low volume 
with public under-confidence it is necessary that private confidence be very low. 
The effects of overconfidence on the volatility of prices are less straightforward.  
In our model, the variance of price is decreasing in the level of private confidence up to 
a threshold value, and from then on it is increasing in it.  In large markets the value of 
private confidence at which price volatility reaches its minimum is strictly below one 
though, and thus we can say that private overconfidence does increase the variance of 
price. On the other hand, public confidence has the opposite effect on volatility: for low 
values of public confidence, volatility is increasing, while for high values it is 
decreasing. 
We have thus arrived at the - testable - conclusion, that the effects of private 
versus public overconfidence are markedly different, which should make a more in 
depth empirical analysis possible. We leave that for the experts. 
 22 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 3.1 
We prove Proposition 3.1 in two steps. First, we compute the equilibrium 
strategy of the type  ) , , ( s s in  having the functional form given in (2). Second, we 
compute the strategy actually played by the existing type  ) , , ( s q in  as a best response to 
the strategies played by the non-existing types  ( ) { }
n j j s s i
¹ , , .  









. There exists a unique symmetric linear 
equilibrium where type (in, s, s) follows the strategy with the functional form given in 
equation (2). The equilibrium values of the parameters defining the strategies are  
,   0 ) , ( = s s a           (A.1) 
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Proof: According to the conjectured linearity of the demand schedules, the market 







n , takes the form of 
0 ) , (   ) , (   ) , (
1
= + - + å
=
z p s s N i s s s s N
N
n
n g b a
 
. 
This implies that the random equilibrium price satisfies 
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(A.4) 
Since each informed trader n considers the others’ strategies as given and consistent 
with equation (2), he is facing the following residual demand: 
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Therefore, speculators solve the following maximization problem (recall that 
c
n E  25 
denotes the expectation taken according to the distributional assumption DA, except 
that the precision of the noise  n e ~  is  e ct , whereas the precision of  j e ~  is assumed to be 
e t , for all 
￿
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The first order condition for this problem is 
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Because of (A.5), (A.6) may be written as  
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) , ( 1









n g  
and this implies that 
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s
n n - - = g            (A.7) 
The second order sufficient condition for the maximization problem is 
( )
, 0





s s N g  
that is,  ) , ( s s g  must be strictly positive. 
Next, note that to observe the random variables  ~ ~ p in   and    is informationally 
equivalent to observing ~ in  and the following random variable: 
  ,   ~ ~
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where the random variable 
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is clearly independent of  n i ~ .  The precision of  ~ y  is 
  ( ) [ ]
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,                            (A.9) 
since trader n correctly believes that the noises of the signals of the other traders have 
precision  e t . Applying the projection theorem for normally distributed random 26 
variables, we can compute the following expectation: 
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, ~ ,             (A.10) 
since each trader of type  ) , , ( s s in  believes that the noise of her own signal has precision 
e st . Substituting (A.10) in (A.7), making the conjecture that 
p s s i s s s s p X n n   ) , (   ) , ( ) , ( ) ( g b a - + = , 
and equating coefficients, we obtain the following system of equations: 





































) , ( 1
) , (
) , ( 1 ) , (  ,                            (A.11) 





























) , ( 1 ) , (  ,                                 (A.12) 



































) , ( 1
) , (
1 ) , ( 1 ) , ( .                             (A.13) 
The solution for ) , ( s s a is clearly zero. We then substitute (A.9) in (A.12) and (A.13). 
Under the assumptions of this Claim, we can find the unique solution of this two-
equation system which satisfies the second order condition, yielding the values of 
) (    and    ) , ( s,s s s g b  given in the statement of the Claim.        Q.E.D. 
 









. There exists a unique symmetric linear 
equilibrium where the type (in, q, s) follows the strategy with the functional form given 
in equation (2). The equilibrium values of the parameters defining the strategies are 
given in the statement of Proposition 3.1. 
Proof:  Since investor n of type (in, q, s) believes that her opponents have a level of 
confidence equal to s, we must compute the best response to the strategies obtained in 
Claim 1.   The residual demand as perceived by individual n is (A.5), where 27 
) , (    and   ) , (   , ) , ( s s s s s s g b a are given by Claim 1. As in the proof of Claim 1, and after 
changing the expectation operator, we arrive at the following optimal quantity xn 
demanded by trader n: 
( ) ] ) , ~ ( [ 1 p p i v E N x n
q
n s n - - = g =  ) (p X n .                    (A.14)     
The equilibrium price, as perceived by a trader n of type (in, q, s), is 
) , ( ) , ( ) 1 (
~ ~ ) , ( ~ ) , ( ) , (
~
s q s s N











where we have used the fact that  0 ) , ( = s s a  as follows from Claim 1. Thus, we see that 
to observe  ~ p and ~ in  is observationally equivalent to observing ~ in  and the following 
random variable: 




i s q s q p s q s s n n ~ ~
) , ( 1
~ ) , ( ) , ( ~ ) , ( ) , ( 1
+ =
-
- - + -
b
b a g g
 , 
where the random variable  ~ y  is defined in (A.8). Following again the steps of the proof 
of Claim 1, we arrive at the formula for the conditional expectation, 
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, ~ ,       (A.15) 
where  y t  is given in (A.9), since speculator n correctly believes that the precision of 
the others’ noise terms is  e t . 
Substituting (A.15) in (A.14), making the conjecture that 
p s q i s q s q p X n n   ) , (   ) , ( ) , ( ) ~ ( g b a - + = , 
and equating coefficients, we get the following system of equations: 
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From (A.16),  ) , ( s q a  is clearly equal to zero. Substituting in the values of 
) , (    ,   ) , ( s s s s g b  and t y  found in Claim 1, and after some tedious algebra to solve the 
system (A.17)-(A.18), we obtain the equilibrium values of  ) , (    and    ) , ( s q s q g b  given in 
the statement of Proposition 3.1.              Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.2 
The sign of the derivative of  ) (q d is straightforward.  
Concerning the properties of  ( ) s q, b  in parts (i) and (ii), we just have to notice 
that the term  ( )
( ) e v
e v




) 2 ( ) 1 ( 2
2
- + + -
+
 appearing in the function  ( ) s q, b  (see 
(3)) is strictly increasing in both q and s, and it converges to a strictly positive limit as s 
tends to zero for  0 > q . On the other hand, the term  ( )s s N N
N N e z
) 1 )( 2 (
) 2 )( 1 (
2
- - +
- - t s
 is a function 
of s that has a unique critical point and it tends to infinity as s tends to either zero or to 
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 For the properties of  ( ) s q, g  in parts (i) and (ii), we see from (4) that the 






t t + 2
 is independent of s, and it converges to 1 as q tends to infinity. The sign of 
the partial derivative of  ( ) s q, g  with respect to q comes from straightforward 
differentiation. We also have that  ( ) ¥ < =
¥ ® ) ( , lim   s s q
q g g  and 
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x  and  2 > N .  After some algebra, it can 









) 1 ( ) 2 ( 2





The limiting behavior of  ) ( ˆ   x g  can be easily checked.       Q.E.D 
 
Proof of Corollary 4.1 
The equilibrium random price is given by 
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= , the result 
follows.                  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Corollary 4.2 
 Parts (i) and (ii) are the result of some omitted tedious computations. Part (iii) 
comes directly from part (ii) of Proposition 3.2. Finally, for part (iv) we can explicitly 
compute  
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where the inequality follows since  2
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s  and  N  is an integer greater than 2. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Corollary 4.3 
 (i) To see that  ) ( ˆ )) 1 , ( x V x V >  in the proposed interval we only have to notice 
that the first summand in the expression for  )) , ( ~ ( s q p Var  in the statement of Corollary 
4.1 is independent of s whereas the second is decreasing in s for a value of public 
confidence sufficiently close to 
2





 as dictated by part (ii) of Proposition 3.2. 
Therefore,  ) , ( ) 1 , ( x x V x V >  for x close enough to 
2





. For the inequality 
) , 1 ( )) ( ˆ x V x V >  in the proposed interval we use the fact that the second summand in the 
expression for  ) , ( s q Var  tends to zero as s approaches 
2




N , whereas the first term 
is strictly increasing in q as follows from part (i) of Proposition 3.2. 
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2
 and make the 
corresponding straightforward comparison. For the second inequality just notice that 
0 ) 0 ( ˆ = V . 
(iii)  Since  ) , 1 ( ) 1 , ( x V x V =  at  1 = x , the result immediately follows from the 
properties of the functions  ). , 1 (    and    ) 1 , ( x x g g  
(iv) and (v)  The proofs are immediate.        Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Corollary 4.4 
Since the random quantity of asset  ~ xn demanded by trader n is normally 











, and we only 
need to compute Var( ) ~ xn . To this end, we replace  ~ p  in the demand 
p s q i s q p X x n n n
~ ) , ( ~ ) , ( = ) ~ ( ~ g b - =   by the formula given in (A.20), and then perform 
the computation of the variance of the individual demand  ~ xn, that turns out to be equal 31 
to ( )( )[ ]
.













          Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Corollary 4.5 
From inspection, we see that the qualitative behavior of  ) , ( s q Q  replicates that  
of  ) , ( s q b . Therefore, all the properties appearing in the statement of this corollary 
follow directly from the characterization of the functions  ) , ( s q b  and  ) ( ˆ x b  given in 


























æ =  , 
that is independent of both  e    and    t tv .          Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Corollary 4.6 















x  since  ) , ( s q b  is increasing in its first argument as follows from part (i) 




) , 1 ( lim
2




b  (see part (ii) 










) 1 ( 2
N
N
b  is finite (see part (i) of Proposition 3.2). 
 (ii) For the first inequality observe that  ¥ =
® ) , 1 ( lim
0 x
x b , whereas  0 ) ( ˆ lim
0 =
® x
x b  as 
follows from parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3.2.  Finally, the second inequality holds 
since  ) , ( s q b  is decreasing for low values of the public confidence s (see part (ii) of  
Proposition 3.2) and, thus,  ) 1 , ( ) , ( x x x b b >  for x sufficiently close to zero.    
(iii)  Since  ) , 1 ( ) 1 , ( x Q x Q =  at  1 = x , the result immediately follows from the 
properties of the functions  ). , 1 (    and    ) 1 , ( x x b b         Q.E.D. 
  
Proof of Corollary 4.7 
(i) Note that the random variable  ~ p  is informationally equivalent to 
x d














= .  Since the precision of x
~
 is 32 
[ ]











, we obtain 
( ) [ ] [ ]













) , ( ~ ~
+
+ =
-                                 (A.19) 
The result immediately follows after subtracting  ( ) [ ] v v Var t =
-1 ~ .  Since  u t  depends on 
q and s only through  ) , ( s q b , it directly follows that it is increasing in the level of 
private confidence, while its dependence on the level of public confidence is non-
monotone, just as in Figure 1. 
 (ii) Obvious from part (iii) of Proposition 3.2. 
(iii) Similarly, we must note that to observe ~ in  and  ~ p  (as defined in (A.4)) is 
informationally equivalent to observe ~ in  and  ~ y , where  ~ y  is defined in (A.8). 




n q y i v Var p i v Var t t t + + = =
- - 1 1 ~ , ~ ~ ~ , ~ ~ , where  y t  is given in 
(A.9). Substituting the equilibrium value  ) , ( s s b  given in the proof of Proposition 3.1, 
and subtracting  v t , we immediately obtain  n t .  
(iv) It is also obvious from part (iii) of Proposition 3.2.    Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Corollary 4.8 
Since the expected total cost of trading for the noise traders is 









= - - , we only need to divide by the number N of insiders so as to 
obtain the average profits of an insider.  The rest of the corollary follows directly from 





Precision of the Noise 







~ ) e j n j    ( ¹  
 
 
First Order Beliefs 
 
Belief of trader n about the 
precision of  ~ en : 
e qt  
(Not Common Knowledge) 
Belief of trader n about the 
precision of  ~ ej : 
e t  
(Common Knowledge) 
 
Second Order Beliefs 
(Common Knowledge) 
Belief of trader j about the 
belief of trader n about the 
precision of  ~ en : 
e st  
Belief of trader j about the 
belief of trader n about the 
precision of  ~ ej : 
e t  
 
Table 1:  Beliefs Structure for all n and 
￿
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Figure 1:  The function  ) , ( s q b  of trading intensity. 
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Figure 2:  The function  ) , ( s q g  of absolute price sensitivity. 
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Figure 3:  The variance of price. 
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